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Innovation and creativity have recently been in the center of the debate on human cultural 
evolution. Yet, we know very little about childrens’ developing capacity to generate novel 
ideas, as a key component of innovation and creativity, in different cultural contexts. Here, 
we assessed 8‐ to 9-year-old children from an autonomous and a relational cultural 
context, namely Münster (urban Germany; n = 29) and Banten (rural Cameroon; n = 29). 
These cultural contexts vary largely in their ecology, social structure, and educational 
system, as well as the cultural models on children’s individual development and thinking. 
Therefore, they provide an optimal contrast to investigate cultural similarities and differences 
in development of creative capacities. We applied classical divergent thinking tasks, 
namely an alternative uses task and a pattern association task. In these tasks, children 
are asked to generate as many ideas as possible what an object could be used for or 
what a pattern could be. First, our study revealed a good internal consistency and inter-
task correlations for the assessment of children’s fluency and the generation of unique 
ideas in both cultures. Second, and most critically, we found significantly higher levels of 
creative capacities in children from Münster in contrast to Banten. This was reflected in 
both a higher number of ideas (fluency) and a higher number of unique ideas (uniqueness). 
Third, looking at the type of answers that children gave in the alternative uses task, 
we found that children from Münster and Banten uttered a similar number of conventional 
ideas, but that children from Münster uttered more ideas to manipulate an object, invent 
novel things with an object, and involve an object in play or pretend play, or in a fantasy 
story. This demonstrates that early creative development is strongly influenced by the 
cultural context and substantiates the cultural nature of human cognitive development.
Keywords: cross-cultural comparison, creativity and innovation, cognitive development, alternative uses task, 
middle childhood
INTRODUCTION
In the current debate on human unique cognitive capacities, a central role has been ascribed 
to both innovation and imitation as two central psychological mechanisms underlying human 
cultural evolution (e.g., Legare and Nielsen, 2015; van Schaik, 2016). According to these accounts, 
high-fidelity imitation is key to acquire the cultural repertoire, and this competence emerges 
early in development. Innovation is equally important and complementary in the sense that it 
allows refining and expanding the cultural repertoire within and across generations. Ontogenetically, 
innovation emerges later, but imitative capacities remain relevant throughout development. 
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Increasing competence and experience of the individual allows 
for the development of higher levels of innovation, with 
adolescents and young adults being the most likely innovators 
(van Schaik, 2016). Thus, individual problem solving and creativity 
play a central role as the driving forces of innovation in human 
cultures. In support of this idea, Neldner et  al. (2019) report 
data that show that, across three different tasks and five different 
cultures, children are relatively poor tool innovators before age 
five and become much more proficient by age nine, across cultures.
At the same time, Neldner et  al. (2019) found support for 
cross-cultural variation in children’s proclivities to innovate. More 
specifically, while innovation across the non-Westernized small-
scale society groups was, in general, similar, the innovation of 
children from a Westernized city was considerably higher. In a 
study on imitative flexibility in 6‐ to 8-year-olds from a 
US-American metropole and a small-scale society in Ni-Vanuatu, 
Clegg and Legare (2016) found Ni-Vanuatu children engaged in 
higher imitative fidelity than US-American children. As one 
reason, the authors discuss that caregivers in US-American educated 
urban middle-class families favor divergent thinking in young 
children, rather than conformity, which might support children’s 
individual inventiveness, leading to these cultural differences. This 
interpretation is further supported by a study on the role of 
conformity in US-American educated urban middle-class and 
rural Ni-Vanuatu adults’ judgments of children’s intelligence (Clegg 
et  al., 2017). Based on multivocal ethnography, this study found 
that US-American adults were less likely to endorse high-conformity 
children as intelligent, often citing creativity as a justification for 
their judgments. In contrast, Ni-Vanuatu adults were more likely 
to endorse Ni-Vanuatu high-conformity children as intelligent.
A central component of creativity and innovation is children’s 
capacity to generate novel ideas (i.e., divergent thinking) as 
an indicator of their creative capacities (Runco and Acar, 2012). 
That is, the generation of novel, original ideas (e.g., Guilford, 
1950) is a critical prerequisite for the production, implementation, 
and dissemination of innovative and useful ideas and products 
(Puccio and Cabra, 2010; Sawyer, 2012). Specifically, divergent 
thinking tasks provide a measure for the quantity and originality 
of ideas that children generate (e.g., Wallach and Kogan, 1965; 
Guilford, 1966; Torrance and Ball, 1984). For example, in the 
so-called alternative uses tasks, children are asked to generate 
different ideas about the use of objects, or in a pattern association 
task, to generate several ideas on what a black-and-white pattern 
could be (Wallach and Kogan, 1965; Ward, 1968). Across several 
studies, these tasks have been found to be  highly suited to 
assess children’s creativity, because they show a high reliability 
(i.e., a high internal consistency and inter-task correlations) 
and are clearly distinct from classical IQ measures (e.g., Wallach 
and Kogan, 1965; Pankove and Kogan, 1968; Cropley and 
Maslany, 1969). Furthermore, they have been applied across 
a broad age range (e.g., Ward, 1968) and have been shown 
to be  relatively stable over time (Kogan and Pankove, 1972). 
Finally, especially the alternative uses and pattern association 
tasks seem to be  suited for an application in non-Western 
and rural contexts because they are conducted with very simple 
materials, which are likewise familiar (objects) or novel (pattern) 
to children in these contexts (cf. Jurkat et al., 2020).
To date, a few studies have applied this or similar tasks in 
non-Western contexts, mostly looking at creativity in children 
from the Asian continent (e.g., Rudowicz et al., 1995; Rudowicz, 
2003, 2004; Marsh, 2010), with a similar level of industrialization 
and education like in Western cultural contexts. Thus, in the 
light of the current debate on cross-cultural differences in 
imitation and innovation between Western and non-Western 
rural contexts of developing countries, outlined above, it would 
be  intriguing to investigate cross-cultural similarities and 
differences in the generation of novel ideas during middle 
childhood in children from more diverse cultural contexts.
Toward this end, in the present study we  selected two often-
studied prototypical cultural contexts, which differ profoundly 
in their ecology, social structure, and educational system, namely 
the city of Münster with families from the educated middle-
class in Germany, and the village of Banten, a subsistence-based 
farming ecology in rural Cameroon, near the municipal of 
Kumbu. The city of Münster is a typical Western context, more 
specifically representing a prototype of an independent (Markus 
and Kitayama, 1991) – or autonomous (Keller and Kärtner, 
2013) – cultural context. Families and household sizes are usually 
small. Parents are occupied in professional jobs and have high 
levels of formal education, and children usually attend the 
kindergarten from age two or three and visit the school from 
around age six. Parental behavior and socialization focus on 
autonomy and individual development, such as making choices 
independently (Kärtner, 2015; Köster et  al., 2016). Children 
from the Nso culture in the village of Banten, a typical non-Western 
context, grow up in large, extended family settings in subsistence-
based villages. This cultural context has been characterized as 
relational (Keller and Kärtner, 2013). This is, socialization practices 
focus on obedience and taking on responsibilities, which is 
associated with social roles in hierarchical social relationships 
(Keller, 2007). Most parents are farmers and engage their children 
in household tasks and fieldwork from early on (Köster et  al., 
2018), and do so in an assertive and demanding tone of voice 
(Köster et  al., 2016). Children visit the preschool from around 
age four and the educational style is dominated by a strong 
hierarchal relation between pupils and the teacher.
Children from both cultural contexts participated in child-
friendly versions of the alternative uses and a pattern association 
task (adapted from Ward, 1968), to assess their abilities for 
divergent thinking. We  assessed children’s generation of novel 
ideas, by the number of ideas (fluency) and the number of 
unique ideas (uniqueness), as two classical indicators for divergent 
thinking. Our main proposal was that children from urban 
Germany would be  more fluent in their generation of novel 
ideas and that they would generate more unique ideas. In 
addition, to get a better idea on the cross-cultural similarities 
and differences concerning the content of the ideas generated, 
we  rated the different types of object uses in the alternative 
uses task (conventional uses, object manipulations, innovative 
ideas, play ideas, pretend play suggestions, and fantasy ideas). 
Our hypothesis was that children from urban Germany may 
generate more innovative, play, pretend play, and fantasy ideas, 
as an expression of their higher levels in the generation of 
novel and creative ideas.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The final sample consisted of 29 8‐ to 9-year-old children 
from urban Germany (M  =  8.69  years, SD  =  0.59, 52% girls) 
and 29 same-aged children from rural Cameroon 
(M  =  8.25  years, SD  =  0.69, 69% girls). One additional child 
in Münster came to the lab but did not want to participate. 
All other children could be  included in the analysis.
In Münster, families were contacted via a database from 
the university. In Kumbo, children were recruited in cooperation 
with local schools. Families received financial compensation 
in Kumbo and cinema coupons in Münster for their participation. 
Note that in Kumbo, the date of birth was not exactly known 
for most children and thus estimated by the mothers. Informed 
written consent was obtained from parents in both contexts, 
and children gave informed assent.
Stimuli and Procedure
Children took part in one experimental session. In Kumbo, 
the laboratory was set up in a quiet room of the school, 
whereas in Münster, participants visited the laboratory of the 
university with a parent. During the session, the child and 
the experimenter were alone in the room with two chairs and 
a table and the room was kept as plain as possible. This is, 
we removed all loose objects in the room (e.g., pictures, rubbish 
bin, etc.) to avoid that these objects could support children 
in forming specific ideas.
Children first took part in an alternative uses task and 
then in a pattern association task. The procedure of both tasks 
was adapted, as close as possible, from a study with children 
at the same age, by Ward (1968). Both tasks were introduced 
as a game. All sessions were video-recorded for subsequent 
transcription and coding of the ideas of the child.
Note that these tasks are commonly differentiated as being 
semantical (alternative uses task) and figurative (pattern 
association task) within the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1984). Furthermore, there are more 
recently developed tests in the field, such as the Creative 
Thinking-Drawing Production (TCT-DP), which may be  better 
in reflecting the processes of creative thinking. However, in 
the present study we  selected those two tasks, because our 
main focus was on children’s generation of novel ideas, these 
tasks were probed with children at school-age (Ward, 1968), 
and we considered them highly suitable (in terms of comparability) 
for an application the two highly different cultural contexts.
Note that we kept the order of tasks constant across cultures, 
because the main focus was on the difference between cultures 
and not the differences between tasks. We  started with the 
alternative uses task, because it is closer to children’s daily 
experiences, such that we  considered it the better start for 
children to warm up and understand the structure of the tasks.
Alternative Uses Task
The task was conducted for five real objects, one after another: 
a piece of string, a cup, a shoe, a stone, and a button (see 
Figure  1A). The task started with a training object (a pencil, 
not included in the final analysis) and was introduced as a 
game called What can you  use it for? The experimenter began 
by introducing the first object “We are first going to play with 
a pencil [handing over a pencil to the child]. Now, I want you to 
tell me all the things you  can think of that you  can do with 
a pencil, or what you  can play with it or what you  can make 
with it.” The experimenter positively acknowledged each idea 
(e.g., “yes, this is a good idea”) and encouraged the child to 
continue (e.g., “What else can you  think of? What else can 
you  do, play or make with a pencil?”). Children could continue 
until they stated that they had no further ideas. In case the 
child generated less than four ideas, the experimenter encouraged 
the child one more time to think of further uses. For the first 
object (i.e., the pencil), the experimenter suggested two additional 
uses in the end. This was to be sure that children would understand 
the task correctly (i.e., “You could also use it to dig in the dirt, 
you  could use it as a flagpole and put a small flag on it, or 
A B
FIGURE 1 | The objects and pattern used in the creativity tasks. (A) Schematic drawings of the objects of the alternative uses task. The objects given to the 
children were real objects. (B) The pattern presented to the children in the pattern association ask. Children were presented the pattern printed on a card, one after 
another. Note that the item on the upper left corresponds to example item, used for the instruction and training of each task.
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you  could put wheels on it to create a toy car”). Thereafter, the 
experimenter repeated the same protocol for the five test objects.
Pattern Association Task
The task was conducted with five abstract patterns (see Figure 1B), 
each printed on a card. Again, the task was introduced by the 
experimenter with a training pattern (Figure  1B, upper left 
pattern), who said “Now we  play a game called What could 
this be? The first thing we  play with is this pattern [showing 
the pattern to the child]. Now, I  want you  to tell me all the 
things you  can think of that this could be.” The behavior of 
the experimenter was identical as for the alternative uses task 
(see above). Again, for the first pattern the experimenter added 
some more suggestions in the end (i.e., “Look, this could also 
be  a tail of a pig, three times the letter ‘e’ or a fence”).
Data Coding and Analysis
Data Preprocessing
All ideas uttered by the child were transcribed from video. 
Children in Cameroon spoke Lamnso, the local language, 
and their ideas were transcribed into English by a local 
research assistant.
In the first step, we  excluded ideas that were redundant, 
irrelevant, or too unspecific. An idea was redundant, if it was 
uttered before by the child for a specific object, or if it implied 
the same action performed with the object, or fulfilled exactly 
the same function as an idea that was uttered before. Examples 
for redundant object uses would be that a pencil could be used 
for painting or drawing, or that a cup could be  used as a 
container for stones or as a container for earth. For the pattern, 
ideas would be redundant if they were repeated, highly similar, 
or synonymous. Examples for redundant ideas would be house 
or villa, or a spoon or a wooden spoon. An idea was excluded 
as irrelevant in case it was not a response to the question 
(e.g., this is black and white) or if the uttered idea could not 
be  related to the object (e.g., to use a pencil for a papernose). 
In accordance with Ward (1968), an idea could not be discarded 
as irrelevant, if it was uttered by at least two children. Finally, 
we  excluded an idea as too unspecific, in case it did not imply 
a specific action or purpose. Examples for unspecific ideas 
would be  one could “put the object somewhere” or that one 
could “make something out of it.”
Finally, before the analysis, we  identified ideas across 
participants, which referred to the same use or purpose. Those 
ideas received the same label and were considered as identical 
ideas. Examples for ideas considered as identical were to tear 
something apart or to pull something apart or also the examples 
given above for ideas that were considered redundant to each 
other. The preprocessed data were used in all subsequent 
analysis steps.
Fluency and Uniqueness
In a first step, we  analyzed participants’ fluency, that is, the 
mean number of different ideas that a participant generated 
for each object. Furthermore, we analyzed the number of unique 
ideas, the mean number of ideas per object that was only 
uttered by one child.
Types of Object Uses
To better understand which aspects the ideas of the children 
between cultures would be  similar or different, we  developed 
six different categories of ideas (for a similar approach, see 
Oncu et  al., 2015). These categories were Conventional, 
Manipulation, Innovation, Play, Pretend Play, and Fantasy.
Conventional
Conventional means that the idea corresponds to the intended 
purpose of an item, namely that its use is functional with a 
reasonable (not playful) goal. Because the number of 
conventional uses is defined by an object, we  developed a 
list with the conventional uses for each object. For example, 
for a pen, this was to write, paint, draw, or to sharpen it 
(see also Oncu et  al., 2015).
Manipulation
Manipulation referred to a non-functional change of the condition 
or location of an object that does not have a playful character. 
For example, to break the pencil apart or to throw it into 
a corner.
Innovation (and Tool Use)
Innovation and tool use were defined as novel uses that are 
realistic, functional, and follow a reasonable goal but are not 
a conventional use of this object. According to Beck (1980), 
this would include the creation of new tools, and specifically 
involve four distinct actions: detach, subtract, reshape, and 
add/combine the object (see also Neldner et  al., 2019, for a 
cross-cultural study on tool innovation). An example would 
be  to use the pen as a flagpole.
Play
Play was defined as any action with the object that does not 
follow an instrumental goal. Examples would be  to throw a 
pen up and catch it again or to balance it on a finger.
Pretend Play
Pretend Play was defined as any symbolic use of the object. 
Namely, any use where the identity of the object was alternated 
to replace another object (Bruner, 1972; see also Oncu et  al., 
2015). An example would be  that a pen would be  used as 
a telephone.
Fantasy
Fantasy ideas were those that were unrealistic, in the sense 
of a fairytale character. For example, beyond the symbolic 
character of pretend play, the object was turned into something 
that does not exist or used for something that is not possible. 
An example would be  that the child would stand on the pencil 
and fly with it or as a magic sword to fight dragons.
We established the interrater reliability for the coding of 
the categories for >20% of the data (i.e., six children in each 
context). The agreement between two independent coders was 
good (Münster: Cohens κ  =  0.85, Banten: Cohens κ  =  0.81).
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RESULTS
Fluency and Uniqueness
First, we  tested the internal consistency for the fluency and 
uniqueness scores across objects and patterns. This revealed 
high consistencies for both cultures and tasks (see Table  1). 
Furthermore, we  tested the correlations between the four 
scores, separated for both cultures. This revealed highly 
significant correlations between the different scores within 
cultures (see Table  2). Thus, in accordance with previous 
studies with children, the tasks seem to be reliable in assessing 
children’s production of creative ideas and did so in both 
cultural contexts.
The mean values and SEs for children’s fluency and uniqueness 
are displayed in Figure 2. We tested the cross-cultural differences 
in fluency and uniqueness, by subjecting those scores to two 
separate mixed ANOVAs with Culture (Münster, Banten) as 
between-subject factor and Task (Object, Pattern) as a within-
subject factor. Children’s fluency was much higher in Münster 
compared to Banten, main effect Culture, F(1, 56)  =  35.60, 
p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.39, and much higher for Objects compared 
to Patterns, main effect Task, F(1, 56)  =  23.74, p  <  0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.30. There was also a significant Culture × Task interaction, 
F(1, 56)  =  17.29, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.24, indexing that in 
Münster the difference in fluency between Objects and Pattern 
was higher than Banten. Children’s number of unique ideas 
were also much higher in Münster compared to Banten, main 
effect Culture, F(1, 56) = 25.59, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.31. However, 
we did not find a main effect of Task, F(1, 56) = 0.31, p = 0.579, 
ηp2  =  0.01, and also no interaction between Culture  ×  Task, 
F(1, 56)  =  2.11, p  =  0.152, ηp2  =  0.04.
Types of Object Uses
We tested the cross-cultural differences in the types of object 
use, by subjecting those scores to a mixed ANOVA with Culture 
(Münster, Banten) as between-subject factor and Type 
(Conventional, Manipulation, Innovation, Play, Pretend Play, 
and Fantasy) as within-subject factor, displayed in Figure 3. 
Looking at which categories children’s ideas differed, we  found 
a main effect of Culture, F(1, 56) = 33.85, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.38, 
reflecting the difference in fluency between both cultures. 
We  further found a main effect Type, F(5, 280)  =  38.87, 
p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.41, and a significant Culture  ×  Type 
interaction, F(5, 280)  =  24.31, p  <  0.001, ηp2  =  0.30. Looking 
at the cross-cultural comparison at the level of single types, 
the only type of object uses that did not differ significantly 
between cultures was the Conventional use, t(56)  =  −0.75, 
p  =  0.456. Children from Münster gave significantly more 
responses in all other categories, namely Manipulation, 
t(56)  =  3.96, p  <  0.001, Innovation, t(56)  =  3.60, p  =  0.001, 
Play, t(56)  =  6.87, p  <  0.001, Pretend Play, t(56)  =  4.14, 
p  <  0.001, and Fantasy, t(56)  =  2.59, p  =  0.012.
TABLE 1 | Consistency of fluency and unique responses across the five  
test items.
Object Pattern
Fluency Uniqueness Fluency Uniqueness
Münster (urban Germany) 0.97 0.92 0.89 0.85
Banten (rural Cameroon) 0.92 0.78 0.89 0.83
Values indicate Cronbach’s ɑ.
TABLE 2 | Correlations between the different scores.
2. 3. 4.
Münster (urban Germany)
1.Object fluency 0.93*** 0.47** 0.52**




1.Object fluency 0.88*** 0.69*** 0.73***
2.Object uniqueness 0.54** 0.56**
3.Pattern fluency 0.92***
4.Pattern uniqueness
(*)p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | The mean fluency and unique ideas for children from both 
cultures. Fluency corresponds to the mean number of ideas uttered by the 
children, per object. Uniqueness corresponds to the mean number of ideas 
only uttered by one child, per object. ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 3 | The mean number of object uses uttered within each of the six 
categories for the alternate uses task (Conventional, Manipulation, Innovation, 
Play, Pretend Play, and Fantasy). The cross-cultural comparison was not 
significant for Conventional responses (p = 0.456), but highly significant for all 
other categories, namely Manipulation (p < 0.001), Innovation (p = 0.001), 
Play (p < 0.001), Pretend Play (p < 0.001), and Fantasy (p = 0.012).
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DISCUSSION
Most critically, the present study revealed significantly higher 
levels in the generation of novel and original ideas in children 
from educated urban middle-class families in Münster, 
Germany, in contrast to children from families with a basic 
level of formal education that live in subsistence-based farming 
ecology in Banten, rural Cameroon. This was reflected in a 
higher fluency and uniqueness of ideas that children from 
Münster generated for objects and patterns. Furthermore, 
the type of answers that children gave in the alternative uses 
task showed that children from Münster and Banten uttered 
a similar number of conventional ideas, but that children 
from Münster uttered more ideas in all other categories. 
These were ideas to manipulate the object, invent novel things 
with the object, and involve the object in a play, a pretend 
play, or in a fantasy story.
Consistent with earlier studies (Wallach and Kogan, 1965; 
Ward, 1968), we  found that the tasks were highly reliable 
(across different objects and patterns used) and that the 
different measures for children’s creative capacities (fluency 
for objects, uniqueness for objects, fluency for patterns, and 
uniqueness for patterns) were highly correlated. Although all 
tasks were framed as a game to motivate the children, it is 
difficult to disambiguate the degree to which the results in 
the tasks are influenced by children’s tendency to interact 
and converse with the experimenter or their verbal fluency. 
Importantly and in support of the conclusion drawn above, 
we found that children from Münster and Banten did not differ 
in the number of conventional ideas they uttered, indicating 
that there was no general difference in children’s readiness 
to participate in the task and express their ideas to 
the experimenter.
These data nicely complement the findings on children’s 
innovation proclivities by Neldner et  al. (2019). Using tool 
manipulation during a problem-solving task as the key indicator 
of innovation, they similarly found that, first, children were 
reasonably proficient innovators by age nine and, second, that 
innovation of children from a Westernized city was considerably 
higher than of children from small-scale societies. Together, 
this converging evidence points toward considerable cross-
cultural variation in key capacities for creativity and innovation 
during middle childhood between WEIRD cultures and small-
scale cultural communities.
The present findings further emphasize that the development 
of creativity and innovation depends largely on culture-specific 
learning experiences. Thereby, they raise intriguing questions 
for different aspects of children’s culture-specific learning 
experiences that explain the cultural variability in creativity. 
Noteworthy, as a result of the choice of two very different 
cultural contexts, it is a limitation of the present study that 
those contexts differ in a high number of social (i.e., socialization 
goals and parenting strategies) and ecological factors 
(i.e., household structure, educational system, parental education, 
urbanization, and mode of subsistence). Thus, it remains a 
matter of debate and potential future investigation to better 
understand which factors are critical in shaping early creative 
capacities. In the following, we will speculate on a few processes 
that may underly the cross-cultural variation identified here.
A central role in culture-specific developmental pathways 
is ascribed to the early parent-child interaction (Keller, 2007; 
Keller and Kärtner 2013; for an example on childrens’ cognitive 
development, see Köster and Kärtner, 2018). Consistent with 
the idea that cross-cultural variation in children’s innovation 
might be  driven by caregivers’ ethnotheories about creativity 
or compliance as key features of the talented child (Clegg 
and Legare, 2016; Clegg et  al., 2017), we  have specifically 
chosen the two cultural contexts in the present study to 
reflect the prototype of an autonomous versus a relational 
cultural context, which have been shown to differ profoundly 
in parental values (Keller, 2007). For instance, parents in 
autonomous cultural contexts typically value independent 
thinking, uttering one’s opinion, and generating novel ideas 
(Keller, 2007) which are also reflected in various aspects of 
their parenting behavior (Keller et  al., 2004; Kärtner, 2015; 
Köster et al., 2016). On the other hand, parents from relational 
cultural contexts typically value conformity and the respect 
of hierarchical social relations (Keller, 2007). On the behavioral 
level, this is reflected in an assertive and insistent way parents 
instruct their children (Köster et  al., 2016). These differences 
in cultural values and practices are likewise reflected in the 
educational system. While in urban Germany, there is an 
emphasis on individual thinking and discourse, in rural 
Cameroon, the emphasis lies on repeating correct responses 
instructed by the teacher. Besides a potential role of parental 
socialization and the differences in educational contexts, 
children’s ecological environment may play a central role in 
the development of creativity and innovation. The environment 
of children in Western, urbanized contexts is largely enriched 
by toys and tools of all sorts, providing them with a diversity 
of experiences that may facilitate their generation of ideas 
what function objects could provide.
While these theoretical considerations fit neatly with the 
stark contrast in creative development found in school-aged 
children in the present study, for future research, it is essential 
to empirically test the role of different experiences children 
make across cultures on their innovative and creative potential 
(cf. Köster and Kärtner, 2019). For example, one could 
specifically test the effect of different parenting strategies and 
styles or different educational systems on children’s 
creative development.
To conclude, our findings substantiate a profound impact 
of the cultural context on children’s creative development 
and highlight that human cognitive development can only 
be  fully understood in the broader developmental and 
cultural context.
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